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Hang Seng Index (H~I) Futures has been listed in Hong Kong 
for six years. This project, through an empirical study, deals 
with various aspect of HSI futures. 
The patterns of futures trading over last six years have 
been investigated. in the study. The findings show that there are 
some changes in the trading patterns over time, but most changes 
occurred after the Crash. Investigation on spread trading in 
some particular periods suggested some specific properties of 
futures prices associate these events. 
The indicators associated the futures trading, including 
gross open interest, net open interest and trading volume, are 
the main focus of this project. In general, these indicators 
seem unable to offer useful information for the trend of stock 
price. In some specific situation, such as "advancing" and 
"declining" market, however, they do provide extra, but limited, 
information for trading. 
Hedge effectiveness, over all the years, is high. But in 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
On February 24, 1982, the Kansas City Board of Trade 
launched stock index futures, based on the Value Line stock 
Index. For the first time, investors can trade futures contracts 
on stock index, although commodity futures have existed for over 
100 years. Following the Kansas City Board of Trade, the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange and the New York Futures Exchange introduced 
futures contracts based on Standard and Poors 500 Index and NYSE 
Composite Index in April 1982 and September 1983 respectively. 
Successful introduction of stock indices futures in US push 
other countries and regions to consider develop their own stock 
futures. As an international financial centre, Hong Kong soon 
followed this trend. On May 6, 1986, Hang Seng Index futures 
began to trade at Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE). The futures 
received warmly welcome by investors shortly after their 
inception. By the third quarter of 1987, the HSI futures became 
the second most active stock futures in the world, only next to 
the S & P futures. This picture discontinued after the Crash in 
1987. 
In the HKFE, currently, there are other four Hang Seng Sub-
indices futures based on the indices of Commerce and Industry, 
Property, utilities and Finance. However, trading activity on 
these futures are very insignificant. The trading volume usually 
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only one for each sub-index future. 
stock index futures provide a mechanism to the investors to 
adjust risk positions in their portfolios. Basically, there are 
three types of traders who enter futures contracts: hedgers, 
arbitrageurs and speculators. If investors hold stock and want 
to protect themselves against the risk of a fall in stocks value, 
they may sell future cdntracts. The falls in the value of the 
stocks will be offset by corresponding gains in the futures 
market. Of course, if the market does not come down, they will 
lose money on futures, which, however, will be offset by the 
increases in the value of stocks. This kind of investors is 
called hedgers. In the market allowing short selling in stocks, 
the opposite situation (short stock, and long futures) may happen 
to the hedgers. Speculators try to anticipate the trend of the 
stock market, and conduct matching transaction on the 
corresponding futures. For instance, if they believe the market 
will boom, they will buy the futures and vice versa. 
Speculators, of course, are prepared to take the risk of the 
opposite market movement to they expectation. Speculators can 
also try to make profit through foreseeing the trend of narrower 
or wider the spread of settlement prices of futures contracts 
with different delivery months. Arbitrageurs are traders who 
seek to exploit risk-free profit by taking advantage of 
sufficient large of spread of futures price and cash price. 
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Research Problems 
In last decade, the properties of stock futures and futures 
market behaviour have ' been investigated extensively. The most 
important topics include: arbi trage opportunity, pricing of 
futures, hedge effectiveness, and market efficiency. The studies 
were based on different futures contract in various ma'rkets. 
Bradford Cornell and Kenneth R. French (1983) studied the price 
of the NYSE Composite Index Futures. They found that the future 
price was relatively low but such low price reflected the impact 
of taxes rather than market inefficiency. Michael H. Hopewell 
and Robert H. Terpstra (1988) examined the pricing of HSI futures 
and they suggested that HSI futures tended to sell at prices 
sufficiently above the level of the spot index to offer frequent 
opportunities for arbitrage profits, almost all of which, 
however, occurred before the stock crash. swati Bhatt and Nusret 
Cakici (1990) concluded that S&P 500 index futures are priced 
overall, at a premium as opposed to a discount with respect to 
the theoretical price. 
In this project, 
different perspectives. 
we try to analyze HSI futures from 
Firstly, the trading behaviour of HSI 
futures from 1986 to 1990 will be reviewed. The trend of volume, 
net open interest and gross open interest will be presented to 
see whether there are some useful information behind them or the 
impact of some particular events happened in the past. Secondly, 
we will put effort on the relationship among the change in spot 
price, future price, net open interest and gross open interest 
and trading volume. Through this investigation, we try to find 
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out whether some inconsistency with market efficiency occurs. 
Thirdly, we concentrate on some particular events, such as the 
Crash, Gulf War and June 4 event, to explore the possibility of 
taking profit through spread strategy. Fourthly, some rules to 
help trading will be given and tested. And finally, brief 
discussion on hedge effectiveness will be presented. 
Research Methodology 
The research is based on empirical study approach. A series 
of books and articles concerning stock futures market have been 
studied first. The articles were mainly selected from Journal of 
Futures Market, security Journal and Journal of Financial Market. 
The data of HSI .futures, including settlement price, stock' 
cash index, trading volume, open interest were collected from the 
Hong Kong Futures Exchange, wi th the help of Dr. Robert H. 
Terpstra. These daily data from 1986 to 1991 were run using SPSS 
and LOTUS. For SPSS, correlation and regression methods are 
adopted in various parts of this project. From the computer-
yielded results, a logical analysis is used to find out their 
implication. In the process of the project, interview with 
relevant persons in HKFE and Hong Kong Future Clearing 
Cooperation Ltd. was also conducted to clarify some problems. 
7 
CHAPTER II: HSI FUTURES AND TRADING PATTERN 
(I) HSI Futures Specification 
The contract terms ofHSI futures are as following: [9] 
Contract Size: The Hang Seng Index Futures times HK$50. 
Quotation: Index Points 
Minimum Fluctuation: One Index Point (HK$50) 
Maximum Fluctuation: 300 points per trading session above or 
below the last closing quotation. No limit is imposed on the spot 
month. 
Trading Hours: Two trading sessions -- 10:00-12:30, 14:30-15:45 
local Hong Kong time. 
Delivery Months: spot month, the next calendar month, and the 
nest two calendar quarter months. 
Last Trading . Day: The business day preceding the last business 
day of the month. 
Settlement Day: The first business day preceding after the last 
trading day. 
Final Settlement Price: An average of quotations for the Hang 
Seng Index taken " at five minute intervals during the last trading 
day rounded down to the nearest whole number. 
Settlement Method: Cash. 
Minimum Margin: HK$15,000 (subject to change) 
Each business day, the related indicators of trading 
activities for each specific future 
Except for prices (settlement, open, 
8 
contract are reported. 
close, high and low), 
trading volume, gross open interest and net open interest are 
listed. 
Delivery months listed above is the pattern of 1991 
contracts. Over last six years, the pattern of delivery months 
have changed several times. Initially, delivery months were two 
consecutive months, including the spot month (From May 6 to May 
23, 1986, contract on May and June were available). Shortly, on 
May 26, the delivery months were added to three consecutive 
months. This picture remained until the end of 1988. From 
January 1989 to the end of 1990, delivery months included four 
consecutive even months. For example, in March, contracts on 
April, June, August and October were traded, while in February, 
maturity months were February, April, June and August. From 1991 
onward, the situation was changed again. For instance, In April, 
delivery months were April, May, June and September. The new 
pattern seems become closer to that in US, where futures 
contracts with three consecutive quarter months are traded. 
(11) Trading Volume, Gross Open Interest and Net Open Interest 
(i) Definitions 
Trading volume is the number of contracts trading within the 
day among the brokers or members in the market. The trading 
activities of the clients within one broker or member is excluded 
for calculation of trading volume. 
Open interest refers to the total number of unliquidated 
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bought or sold contracts (one side only). There are two ways of 
expressing open interest, namely, Gross Open Interest and Net 
Open Interest. Gross open interest refers to the sum of all the 
futures contracts that remain to be liquidated. It represents the 
sum of long (or short) position of all brokers or members. Net 
open interest refers to the sum of the net amount of futures 
contracts that remain to be liquidated. It stands for total net 
long (or net short) of all brokers and members. 
The two indicators, gross open interest and net open 
interest, provide different information of market activity. 
Gross position in the market reflects the situation of 
transaction activities of brokers and individual clients, while 
net position offers the information of trading among brokers, 
regardless of position of individual clients. 
There are also definitions of gross open interest and net 
open interest for each broker. A broker's gross open interest 
is the sum of his long and short position. A broker's net open 
interest is the net of his long and short position. By 
definition, the gross open interest of the market is the half of 
total of all brokers' gross open interest. Before the stock 
crash, the brokers' margin requirement is based on their net open 
interest. This calculation' base was shifted to gross open 
interest after the Crash to protect the operation of the futures 
market. 




Broker A Broker B Broker C The Market 
Long 25 18 27 70 
Short 15 12 43 70 
Gross Open 40 30 70 70 
Interest 
Net Open 10 (long) 6 (long) 16 (short) 16 
Interest 
The net open interest of the market is total net long or net 
short of all brokers' positions. 
DAY 2: 
Broker A sells 2 contracts to broker B, one for reverse trading 
and one for adding short position for the clients of broker A. 
The clients of Broker B add two long positions. The trading 
volume is 2 and the position is: 
Broker A Broker B Broker C The Market 
. Long 24 ' 20 27 71 
Short 16 12 43 71 
Gross Open 40 32 70 71 
Interest 




Two clients of broker A give the instruction to A, one closes one 
long contract and the other closes one short contract. The 
trading volume is 0, but the gross open interests of Broker A as 
well as the market are changed: 
Broker A Broker B Broker C The Market 
Long 23 20 27 70 
Short 15 12 43 70 
Gross Open 38 32 70 70 
Interest 
Net Open 8 (long) 8 (long) 16 (short) 16 
Interest 
(ii) Behaviour 
Trading volume of HSI futures was quite high from the 
beginning of the futures. The average daily volume exceeded 
10,000 in February 1987. In the following months, the over-
heated situation emerged. Many local citizens were involved in 
futures trading. There were reports indicating that tax-drivers 
and amahs were engaging in trading activity in the future market. 
By the September 1987, the average daily volume, 27,318, reached 
the peak. The volume plummeted after the stock crash. The 
average daily volume in November was only 2,247, or less than 10% 
of that in October. Worse, it continued to decline and from 
December 1987 onwards, the average daily trading volume remained 
the level of less than 1,000. This circumstance continued until 
January of 1989. On the yearly basis, average daily volume of 
1988 is the lowest, reflecting the lack of confidence of traders 
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after the Crash. In 1989, it increased to 960, up 70% over 1988. 
But in 1990, no improvement of trading activity was witnessed. 
The recovery 'of futures market was recorded in the year of 1991, 
with average trading volume of 2,024, increasing 112% over the 
preceding year. The level of trading activity in 1991, however, 
was only equivalent to 40% of that in 1986. 
Basically, there is no significant monthly fluctuation in 
average daily trading volume. One evident exception happened in 
August of 1990. The average daily trading volume of that month 
was 2,440, more than double of the yearly figure. This situation 
may be because a lot of traders entered the market in expecting 
high market volatility due to Iraq's invasion. 
Other indicators, gross open interest and net open interest, 
showed almost the some pattern of volume in last six years. The 
details are listed in Table 2.1. in the next page. 
The gross open interest and net open interest are highly 
correlated in the studied period, with the correlation 
coefficients of 0.93684. The regression equation is: 
GO(t) = 842.396 + 1.861NO(t) 
where GO(t) and NO(t) represent the gross open interest and net 
open interest at time t respectively. 
(iii) Active Contracts 
At each business day, the trading volumes of different 
delivery months contracts differ significantly. Usually, one 
TABLE 2.1: INDICATORS OF FUTURES TRADING 
(total contracts, average number for a trading day) 
MONTH GROSS NET VOLUME MONTH GROSS NET VOLUME 
OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN 
8605 3205 1241 1635 9001 2544 1371 594 
8606 6723 2177 2003 9002 3038 1502 859 
8607 7118 3070 2819 9003 2670 1397 424 
8608 11758 4865 4115 9004 2841 1633 478 
8609 16066 6269 5628 9005 2322 1201 532 
8610 23983 7270 8829 9006 2813 1342 630 
8611 15917 9476 7709 9007 2777 1301 864 
8612 16782 9985 7202 9008 4560 1526 2440 
9009 4057 1690 1102 
8701 22631 13739 9757 9010 4299 1769 1301 
8702 26037 15725 11143 9011 4190 1724 956 
8703 31863 18009 14699 9012 4959 1755 1138 
8704 33783 20184 14554 
8705 31464 19013 13952 9101 3885 1485 1235 
8706 34545 19708 17050 9102 4966 2168 2084 
8707 37882 22597 18283 9103 5058 2179 2035 
8708 45682 24797 24169 9104 5474 2408 2402 
8709 59783 30119 27318 9105 5710 2483 2791 
8710 67066 30521 23506 9106 5412 2536 1944 
8711 25086 9549 2247 9107 7204 3945 2626 
8712 4692 1582 795 9108 6268 2940 2343 
9109 4494 2508 1259 
8801 1760 868 774 9110 4643 2186 1752 
8802 1702 982 674 9111 5359 2082 2236 
8803 1670 869 626 9112 4887 2088 1447 
8804 2337 925 903 
8805 2429 1047 785 YEAR GROSS NET VOLUME 
8806 2163 791 653 OPEN OPEN 
8807 1858 701 448 
8808 1531 759 378 1986 12801 5588 5032 
8809 1580 691 359 1987 34616 18623 14680 
8810 1627 693 489 1988 1833 790 567 
8811 1727 715 472 1989 3418 1480 960 
8812 1651 458 296 1990 3420 1513 952 
1991 5298 2429 2024 
8901 2095 741 573 
8902 3455 1501 1110 
8903 4344 2379 979 
8904 4806 2778 1131 
8905 4877 2133 1770 
8906 3771 1236 1262 
8907 2622 1072 812 
8908 3481 1331 986 
8909 2748 979 565 
8910 3245 1216 1122 
8911 2837 1204 608 
8912 2667 1216 536 
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TABLE 2.2: NO. OF DAYS TO MATURITY WHEN THE CONTRACTS 
GAIN AND LOSE THEIR MOST ACTIVE POSITIONS 
MONTH GAIN LOSE MONTH GAIN LOSE 
8606 8 39 8901 7 41 
8607 12 41 8902 7 35 
8608 8 41 8904 9 66 
8609 6 40 8906 9 72 
8610 9 37 8908 7 71 
8611 9 37 8910 11 68 
8612 14 42 8912 10 70 
8701 13 42 9002 11 68 
8702 10 43 9004 3 70 
8703 12 42 9006 2 65 
8704 13 42 9008 10 66 
8705 14 42 9010 7 71 
8706 12 46 9012 9 66 
8707 9 43 
8708 9 37 9101 
8709 13 42 9102 8 70 
8710 0 43 9103 7 36 
8711 0 28 9104 6 40 
8712 1 33 9105 8 37 
9106 2 36 
8801 1 30 9107 8 35 
8802 1 30 9108 8 38 
8803 2 34 9109 2 37 
8804 1 31 9110 6 35 
8805 3 33 9111 6 35 
8806 1 33 9112 11 38 
8807 1 30 
8808 6 34 
8809 2 36 
8810 4 31 
8811 5 35 
8812 7 35 
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month contract is traded more actively than the others. Table 
2.2 shows the numbers of days to expiration for each most active 
contract. The most active contracts are not always the current 
month contract, and the most active position of one particular 
month contracts often is unable to remain until the contracts 
mature. Instead, it will be replaced by other month contracts 
in some trading day. (the most active position is shifted). 
Interestingly, the shift pattern does not remain constant 
over the last six years. The most significant change occurred 
after the stock crash. Before the Crash, the most active 
position of one delivery month contract usually was replaced by 
the following delivery month contract when it was 10 to 15 days 
to expiration (i.e. shift happened around 15th of the month). 
From October 1987 to July 1988, the current month contracts 
maintained as most active position until they almost expired . . 
Particularly, October and November contracts were the most active 
ones in October and November respectively. The reason that 
investors tended to trade shorter contracts was the confidence 
to the market plummeted after the Crash. From August of 1988 
onwa.rds, shift time of most active contracts became earlier than 
immediately after the Crash. In general, however, even in 1991, 
shift time was not as early as the first three quarters of 1987. 
This is consistent to the fact that current trading activity has 
still not achieved the level of that in 1987. 
Table 2.2 also indicates that, in 1989 and 1990, the number 
of days to expiration for the most active contract can be around 
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70. The reason is that only contracts with even month were 
traded in this period. 
Not surprisingly, futures contracts with everyone delivery 
month experienced a period of most active position. The only one 
exception is the contracts of January of 1991, which have ' never 
be most active, due to shift of the pattern of delivery months 
in January of 1991. 
Usually, after one particular month contract recedes from 
the most active position, it will not regain such a position. 
However, there were some exceptions, which all happened after the 
Crash. For example, On April 18, 1989, the most active position 
of April contract was replaced by June contract, but next day, 
it became most active again. Such situation is believed to be 
just an coincidence and does not have significant meaning. 
There is also a shift time in terms of net open interest. 
The shift time of net open interest is defined as the time from 
which onwards, the dominating position in terms of net open 
interest of one delivery month contracts will be replaced by 
other month contracts. The shift time of net open interest is 
usually not the same as that of trading volume. We may first 
write out the relationship of these two indicators: 
NO(t) = NO(t-1) + vet) - CL(t) 
where vet) represents the trading volume at time t, and CL(t) is 
the number of contracts which are closed during the day t. 
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TABLE 2.3: SHARE OF MOST AND NEXT ACTIVE CONTRACTS FOR INDICATO 
MOST ACTIVE NEXT ACTIVE 
MONTH GROSS NET VOLUME GROSS NET VOLUME 
OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN 
8605 63.60 61.85 66.63 34.98 35.48 31.11 
8606 69.66 61.87 69.33 25.89 30.22 24.94 
8607 60.98 59.57 66.88 23.14 21.31 23.09 
8608 60.01 53.95 65.59 33.88 35.40 30.22 
8609 63.19 58.48 64.12 32.10 33.88 31.27 
8610 63.75 58.31 69.06 33.79 37.78 28.65 
8611 68.06 66.34 71.86 30.61 32.01 26.97 
8612 68.54 67.97 68.03 27.87 27.53 29.22 
8701 62.17 61.30 61.95 32.79 32.28 34.67 
8702 53.65 46.06 61.38 35.94 39.19 31.99 
8703 58.24 53.07 65.81 36.95 40.34 31.14 
8704 66.65 64.06 67.55 31.04 33.09 30.31 
8705 65.15 66.90 62.86 32.09 29.67 35.26 
8706 64.62 64.45 62.81 32.90 32.43 35.35 
8707 61.59 57.98 63.49 35.55 38.52 33.99 
8708 57.00 51.16 65.67 35.00 37.12 30.56 
8709 55.00 50.38 64.72 37.68 37.19 32.23 
8710 53.57 32.16 64.04 38.35 52.40 32.54 
8711 81.73 90.97 73.73 18.27 9.02 26.26 
8712 89.71 85.77 87.41 10.29 14.23 12.59 
8801 85.09 80.60 87.54 14.64 18.85 12.38 
8802 85.77 86.47 89.34 14.22 13.50 10.62 
8803 79.26 77.58 84.69 20.38 21.82 15.03 
8804 76.75 74.06 80.65 23.25 25.94 19.35 
8805 82.92 81.85 84.12 17.04 18.05 15.86 
8806 85.94 81.80 83.36 14.06 18.20 16.64 
8807 85.94 81.21 82.85 13.93 18.48 16.83 
8808 80.44 77.67 79.53 19.41 22.03 20.17 
8809 80.48 79.71 79.83 19.50 20.25 20.10 
8810 73.80 70.63 76.36 25.11 27.90 23.06 
8811 81.95 79.62 80.34 18.04 20.37 19.65 
8812 81.94 74.82 81.21 17.99 24.96 18.76 
8901 70.82 61.73 72.54 25.52 31.31 24.69 
8902 69.70 64.54 71.49 29.02 33.07 26.77 
8903 91.87 88.81 93.47 8.00 10.97 6.36 
8904 71.75 71.39 68.95 27.69 27.77 30.92 
8905 96.31 94.89 96.77 3.67 5.07 3.22 
8906 69.59 67.75 82.87 30.37 32.15 17.09 
8907 95.63 91.34 98.02 4.30 8.48 1.94 
8908 77.95 75.60 80.89 21.89 24.01 19.05 
8909 98.23 96.78 99.14 1.77 3.22 0.86 
8910 76.42 72.02 77.94 23.57 27.96 22.04 
8911 99.59 99.10 99.83 0.41 0.90 0.17 
8912 76.00 77.40 76.93 24.00 22.60 23.07 
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TABLE 2 .3: SHARE OF MOST AND NEXT ACTIVE CONTRACTS FOR INDICATO 
(continued) 
MOST ACTIVE NEXT ACTIVE 
MONTH/ GROSS NET VOLUME GROSS NET VOLUME 
YEAR OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN 
9001 99.15 98.62 99.36 0.95 1.54 0.74 
9002 75.30 72.61 80.46 24.55 27.16 19.42 
9003 99.46 99.07 99.57 0.53 0.89 '0.70 
9004 80.37 80.35 74.81 19.50 19.47 24.96 
9005 99.22 98.90 99.57 0.93 1.29 0.81 
9006 80.89 79.43 78.99 18.97 20.36 20.60 
9007 95.53 95.25 97.65 5.04 5.19 2.69 
9008 74.18 72.48 84.98 25.31' 26.68 14.89 
9009 97.55 96.27 98.51 2.74 3.96 2.13 
9010 76.06 69.12 80.94 23.45 30.13 18.51 
9011 97.77 96.65 97.79 2.64 3.87 2.84 
9012 68.66 67.64 69.48 30.99 31.84 30.11 
9101 90.11 87.40 96.64 8.61 10.39 2.16 
9102 70.70 67.30 75.00 28.93 32.16 24.89 
9103 73.86 73.36 77.84 25.59 25.42 22.15 
9104 76.76 74.83 81.12 22.59 23.81 18.76 
9105 80.15 77.85 83.92 19.59 21.80 16.03 
9106 85.89 85.61 83.79 13.83 14.09 16.24 
9107 68.67 65.09 79.56 30.69 34.08 20.28 
9108 79.43 75.82 77.78 20.24 23.58 21.89 
9109 80.96 82.18 79.41 18.13 16.76 20.15 
9110 78.02 77.28 82.39 19.57 19.15 17.18 
9111 76.79 71.53 80.82 22.98 27.96 19.24 
9112 73.74 71.71 79.43 26.10 27.92 20.62 
1986 64.84 62.09 68.09 30.78 31.76 28.46 
1987 60.76 55.66 64.49 34.00 36.37 32.48 
1988 81.79 79.19 83.00 18.04 20.52 16.87 
1989 83.39 81.18 85.39 16.23 18.14 14.28 
1990 85.76 85.11 87.52 14.19 14.77 12.48 
1991 77.42 75.01 81.15 21.93 23.96 18.66 
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-
From above equation, we can develop that 
NO(t,M) - NO(t,N) = [NO(t-1,M) - NO(t-1,N)] + [V(t,M) - V(t,N)] 
- [CL(t,M)-CL(t,N)]. 
where M, N denote most active and next active contracts 
respectively. 
As long as CL(t,M) is sufficiently more than CL(t-1,M), 
NO(t,M) - NO(t,N) can be negative. Therefore, the most active 
contracts does not necessarily possess more net open interest 
than the other month contracts. 
The relationship between the shift time of trading volume 
and that of net open interest changed after the Crash. Before 
the Crash, shift time of net open interest was usually about five 
days earlier than that of trading volume. In October of 1987, the 
'shift time of net open 
early, indicating that 
interest, October 2, came especially 
traders tended to maintain longer 
contracts and close more current month contract. 
Table 2.3 lists the share of most active and next active 
contracts for each month. The indicators include trading volume, 
gross open interest and net open interest. Again, we can 
classify the pattern as before and after the Crash. 
Before the Crash, the most active contracts usually 
accounted for two third of trading volume, gross open and net 
open interest. 
actively traded. 
The next active contracts were still rather 
After the crash, the share of active contract 
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TABLE 2.4: TRADING ACTIVITY FOR DISTANT CONTRACT 
(No. of days to mature: first trading vs. first available) 
MONTH FIRST FIRST MONTH FIRST FIRST 
AVAILABLE TRADING AVAILABLE TRADING 
8605 23 23 8901 91 58 
8606 52 52 8902 88 56 
8607 65 65 8904 117 111 
8608 86 86 8906 149 136 
8609 91 91 8908 183 173 
8610 91 91 8910 182 123 
8611 89 89 8912 211 120 
8612 91 91 
9002 242 60 
8701 88 88 9004 239 102 
8702 88 88 9006 240 121 
8703 89 89 9008 242 122 
8704 88 88 9010 243 116 
8705 89 89 9012 242 119 
8706 90 90 
8707 91 91 9101 241 112 
8708 88 88 9102 87 70 
8709 91 91 9103 60 60 
8710 90 90 9104 60 60 
8711 88 88 9105 238 150 
8712 91 91 9106 60 60 
9107 57 57 
8801 89 89 9108 239 74 
8802 87 57 9109 60 60 
8803 90 78 9110 60 60 
8804 88 62 9111 59 59 
8805 91 67 9112 244 121 
8806 90 60 
8807 90 59 
8808 91 56 
8809 91 66 
8810 89 58 
8811 90 62 
8812 90 90 
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was often around 80% in terms of trading volume, gross open and 
net open position. This is also can be explained as investors 
likes to trade near contract after the Crash. 
Again, October of 1987 is a particular month. While the 
trading volume of most active contract was twice as many as that 
of next active contracts, the average daily net open interest of 
most active contract 9814, was less than that of next active 
contract 15994. This is because the shift time of net open 
interest came especially early as stated above. 
Currently, there are four delivery month contracts available 
for trading. But usually, no trading activity takes place for 
the distant contract. So it is interesting to know when the 
distant contracts began to traded. Table 2.4 gives the number 
of days to maturity for the contracts when it is first available 
and when there is trading activity (defined as there is positive 
volume at least two consecutive business days). 
Before the Crash, every month contract listed in the market 
had positive trading volume. This picture discontinued after the 
Crash. For example, the contract with delivery month of February 
1988, which began to be listed in the market at the end of 
November 1987, had not been traded until December 20, 1987. In 
1988, contract usually received trading one month after it 
appeared in the market. 
From 1989 onwards, the days to expiration of distant 
contract can be up to 240, but few contracts were traded when 
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they had more than 120 days to mature. There occasionally some 
trading activities for the distant contract with 60 to 120 days 
to expire, but the trading volume usually below '10, very inactive 
compared with the near contract. In 1991, we witnessed that 
trading volume grew substantial. The distant contract, however, 
had not received more attention than the previous years. 
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CHAPTER Ill: SPREAD TRADING 
One of the trading strategies is spread trading. In this 
strategy, traders try to make profit through the change of the 
discrepancy of the prices of two different month contracts. we 
use the following example for illustration. 
Day 1: The price of January and February contracts are 4,000 and 
4,050 respectively. If the trader believe that the 50 point 
spread will be wider, he/she can sell one January contract, and 
at the same time, buy one February contract. 
Day 2: The prices of two contracts grow . to 4,010 and 4,110 
respectively, representing 1~0 point difference. The trader now 
can close his long position in February contract and short 
position in January contract. 
From January contract, he/ she loses 10 points (4, 010-4, 000) , 
or $500, but from February contract, he/she gains 60 points 
(4,110-4,050), or $3,000. The net profit of such transaction is 
$2,500. (We assume no transaction cost). If the price difference 
became narrower, say 10, the trader would lose $2,000. 
If the price spread of two month contract were too wide, the 
spread of one month contract and cash price would create an 
arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, spread trading is less risky 
than just short or long futures. The loss of wrong estimation of 
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market can be locked in the certain level. Of course, one can 
not expect to achieve great return under this strategy. 
The futures price of near contract is not necessarily below 
that of longer term contract. If traders hold pessimistic views 
towards to the future, the negative spread may happen. (We define 
spread as price of the longer term contract less that of shorter 
term contract) 
Now we are going to look at some empirical data, which 
associated with some particular event in the past. The purpose 
is to see how these events caused the change in price spread of 
the futures contracts. We choose three typical events, the Crash 
in October 1987, June 4 event in 1989 and Iraq's invasion in 
August 1990. These three events had resulted in dramatic movement 
in Hong Kong stock market. We may make comparison of average five 
days spread for three periods: the five days period before the 
event, one to five days and six to ten days after the event. 
-' 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
The Crash 40.8 15.9 3.9 
June 4 Event 46.1 23.0 -1.0 
Iraq's Invasion 39.8 42.8 8.4 
* For the Crash, several days were omitted. Period 2 and period 
3 lag three days respectively compared with the definition. The 
reason of such treatment is that spread immediately after the 
Crash was extremely wide due to limitation of price change upon 
on the futures contract except cash month contract. 
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The spread tends to became narrower and narrower over three 
period for the first two events. For the third event, the spread 
of period 3 was significant smaller than that of period 2. These 
phenomena mirrored the confidence towards future market movement 
was hurt by the events. Under such situation, one may consider 
the following trading strategy after the some particular events 
causing market plummets. 
In the first few days after the event, traders may long the 
current month contract and short the next delivery month 
contract. And in the following several days, they close their 
long and short position. The scenario here is exactly oppositive 
as the example at the beginning of this Chapter. 
One may suspected that the narrower spread may due to the 
declining of stock price, which may also associated the lack of 
confidence to the market. In these three particular events, 
however, this conclusion is untrue. 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
The Crash 2751.94 2235.31 2351.16 
June 4 Event 3839.55 2107.13 2121.27 
Iraq's Invasion 3424.93 3090.93 3120.92 
The above figures are the average 5 days close price for 
three period. Actually, the average price of period 3 increased 
compared to the period 2. 
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CHAPTER IV: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGE IN PRICE AND CHANGE IN 
MARKET INDICATORS 
In the efficient market, change in stock price of one day 
does not render any information for the price change in the 
following days. Similarly, the price change in futures market 
cannot convey the knowledge of the spot price in the near future 
under the assumption of market efficiency. 
For different periods, correlation coefficients between 
change (relative change) in spot price (close index in the stock 
market) and futures price (settlement price for the most active 
future contract) are calculated and provided as following. 
The changes in futures prices are lagged one to five trading 
days. 
No. of 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
days lag 
1 0.149 0.051 0.155 -0.078 0.129 0.017 
2 0.025 -0.093 0.060 -0.131 -0.055 0.022 
3 -0.010 0.149 -0.047 0.100 0.110 -0.152 
4 0.099 0.076 0.018 -0.057 -0.061 0.025 
5 -0.083 0.041 -0.097 -0.067 -0.058 0.045 
The coeff icients are very low, most of which are below o. 10. 
The ceilings in absolute value is only 0.155. Two tail test 
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suggests that all correlations are insignificant at the level of 
0.05. This phenomenon is consistent with the market efficiency 
assumptions. 
Correlations between the spot price change and the changes 
in other market indicators are also computed. The table 4.1 
shows the details of correlation coefficients. Again, one to 
five days lagged data are all considered. The level of all 
correlation is also quite low, and only few of coefficients show 
significant at the level of 0.05. Such significance all happens 
in some particular years, and is believed as coincidence. 
Actually, the coefficients over the entire period (1986 to 1991) 
are extremely low. None exceeds 0.05 and all are statistically 
insignificant. 
We thus can conclude that all of market indicators of 
futures, futures price, gross open interest, net open interest 
and trading volume, in general, are unable to signal the trend 
of price in the stock market. 
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TABLE 4.1: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
(Change in spot price vs change in open interest and volume) 
LAG DAYS 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 86-91 
(Spot price vs Gross open interest) 
1 0.014 0.075 -0.028 -0.083 -0.047 0.045 0.015 
2 0.110 0.037 0.049 -0.013 -0.113 0.143 0.044 
3 0.021 -0.030 0.029 0.053 -0.006 0.032 0.011 
4 0.000 0.005 0.169@ 0.051 0.130 -0.041 -0.001 
5 -0.175 0.109 -0.014 0.106 0.036 0.044 0.022 
(Spot price vs Net open interest) 
1 0.046 0.020 -0.001 -0.050 -0.032 0.002 -0.011 
2 -0.050 -0.006 -0.015 -0.033 0.017 0.157@ 0.023 
3 0.196@ -0.035 0.119 -0.085 -0.046 -0.016 -0.015 
4 -0.157 0.024 0.033 -0.041 -0.049 0.023 -0.010 
5 0.117 0.029 0.066 -0.108 -0.052 0.001 -0.011 
(Spot price vs Trading volume) 
1 -0.168 -0.071 0.093 -0.009 0.122 0.104 0.004 
2 -0.046 0.056 -0.071 0.052 0.049 -0.092 0.016 
3 0.052 -0.008 0.005 -0.026 0.007 0.178@ 0.008 
4 0.073 0.102 -0.097 0.049 0.023 -0.021 0.031 
5 -0.033 -0.011 0.135 -0.001 0.033 -0.099 -0.001 
@ significant at level 0.10 
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CHAPTER V: TRADING BASED ON FUTURES MARKET INDICATORS 
In the last chapter, we suggest that the futures market 
indicators, generally, cannot render useful information for the 
price trend of the stock price. However, further investigation 
of open interest and trading volume reveals that these 
indicators, in some particular circumstances, may reflect the 
behaviour of traders in the market. The traders' expectations, 
more or less, would hint the price trend. Basically, there are 
two scenarios: [8] 
1. Increase in open interest in an advancing market 
indicates that the buyers are the dominant force in the market. 
If the trading volume is also very high, this implies that the 
buyers are urgently buying the market. Thus, the validity of the 
uptrend can be confirmed. 
2. Similarly, increase in open interest in a declining 
market indicates that the sellers are in control. If the trading 
volume goes up, this implies that the sellers are urgently 
selling the market. Thus, we can confirm that the market must 
be very bearish. 
Based on these two assertions, we are going to set up some 
rules to foretell the market movement in the future. 
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Obviously, there is a need to define "advancing" and 
"declining" market. For the sake f · th . o convenlence, e change ln 
S-day moving average of spot price is adopted as an indicator to 
represent the general market movement. 
Specifically, let set) be the spot price at time t. 
Define 
AS (t) = { S (t - 4) + S (t - 3) + S (t - 2 ) + s (t -1) + S (t) } / S . [ S . 1 ] 
CAS(t) = { AS(t) - AS(t-1) } / AS(t-1). [S.2] 
If CAS(t) > O.S%, the market is called as "advancing" at the time 
t. Similarly, if CAS(t) < -o.S%, it is in a "declining" stage. 
This definition emphasizes the price change over a few days 
rather than price change in one particular day. The moving 
average is adopted to measure the price level in order to 
moderate the some daily fluctuation effect. O.S% critical level 
is set up for highlighting the significance of price level change 
in order to claim the market is in the "advancing" or "declining" 
stages. By the definition, even though in some specific trading 
day, the price decreases compared with the previous trading day, 
the market on that day may still be considered as "advancing". 
This phenomenon, however, cannot harm the rationality of the 
definition. We now further investigate the meaning of 
"advancing" and "declining" -under the foregoing definition. 
In an advancing market, from equations [S.l] and [S.2], 
we can obtain: 
set) - S(t-S) > o.OOS {S(t-S) + S(t-4) + S(t-3) + S(t-2) +S(t-1)} 
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or, 
set) - S(t-S) > 0.02SAS(t-1). 
Hence, the advancing maiket means that, compared with the 
close price S trading days ago, the current price is at least 
2.5% of previous moving average price more. For example, if 
AS (t-1) is 4,000, then advancing market suggest that current 
close price at least has grown 100 point within S trading days. 
The analysis indicates our definitions make sense. 
In the declining market, similarly, 
set) - S(t-S) < -0.02SAS(t-1). 
The reason we choose "five days" to take average is the 
number of trading days in one week usually is five. The 
advancing or declining thus reflects the price change in one 
week. 
According the two assertion at the beginning of this 
chapter, we now develop some rules to predict the price level in 
the near future. 
Let CGO(t), CNO(t), and CV(t) represent the change in gross 
open interest, net open interest and trading volume in the whole 
market at time t, respectively. That is, 
CGO(t) - {GO(t) - GO(t-1)} / GO(t-l) 
CNO(t) = {NO(t) - NO(t-1)} / NO(t-1) 
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CV(t) - {V(t) - V(t-1)} / V(t-1) 
Rule 1: In the advancing market (when CAS(t) > 0.5%), if CNO(t»O 
and CV(t»O, then the average close price of next five days 
would be higher than current moving average price, i.e. 
AS(t+5) > AS(t) . 
In the declining market (when CAS(t) < -0.5%), if CNO(t»O 
and CV(t»O, then AS(t+5) < AS(t). 
To measure the accuracy of thts rule, the empirical data 
from 1986 to 1991 are adopted to test the performance. The 
result is shown as follows: 
YEAR TOTAL CORRECT ACCOUNT WRONG ACCOUNT 
OBSERVATION PREDICT FOR (%) PREDICT FOR (%) 
1986 21 19 90.5 2 9.5 
1987 31 29 93.5 2 6.5 
1988 23 20 87.0 3 13.0 
1989 26 15 57.7 11 42.3 
1990 21 18 85.7 3 14.3 
1991 20 18 90.0 2 10.0 
86-91 142 119 83.8 23 16.2 
86-91 116 104 89.7 12 10.3 
exclude 89 
Overall, the number of cases of correct prediction accounts 
for 83.8% of total observation. 1987 shows the best performance 
with 93.5% of correct forecasting, while 1989 is the worst, only 
57.7% of observations being correctly foretold. If the year 1989 
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is excluded from the consideration, the overall accuracy grows 
to 89.7%. 
It seems that the rule is a good mechanism to predict the 
stock price trend. One may suspect that whether the net open 
interest and trading volume render information to increase the 
accuracy of forecasting, because, in the last chapter, the 
correlation coefficients between price change and changes in open 
interest and volume with one to five days lagged is extremely 
low. To answer this question, we eliminate the net open interest 
and trading volume from Rule 1, and yield Rule 2: 
Rule 2: If CAS(t) > 0.5%, then AS(t+5) > AS(t). 
If CAS(t) < -0.5%, then AS(t+5) < AS(t). 
The empirical test offers the performance of Rule 2: 
YEAR TOTAL CORRECT ACCOUNT WRONG ACCOUNT 
OBSERVATION PREDICT FOR (%) PREDICT FOR (%) 
1986 57 48 84.2 9 15.8 
1987 84 69 82.1 15 17.9 
1988 79 63 79.7 16 20.3 
1989 96 75 78.1 21 21.9 
1990 79 65 82.3 14 17.7 
1991 68 58 85.3 10 14.7 
86-91 463 378 81.6 85 18.4 
86-91 367 303 82.6 64 17.4 
exclude 89 
Compared with the Rule 2, Rule 1 has better performance in 
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all years, ~xcept 1989. For the entire period, information of 
net open interest and trading volume causes the accuracy up 2.2%, 
providing a marginal improvement. If the year 1989, is excluded, 
the improvement is more pronounced with 7.1% of accuracy. 
As stated in the early chapter, there exists a posi ti ve 
relationship between the gross open interest and net open 
interest. Hence, the net open interest in Rule 1 may be replaced 
by gross open interest. This leads to Rule 3: 
Rule 3: If CAS(t) > 0.5%, CGO(t) > 0 and CV(t) > 0, 
then AS(t+5) > AS(t) . 
If CAS(t) < -0.5%, CGO(t) > 0 and CV(t) > 0, 
then AS(t+5) < AS(t). 
Similarly, we can produce the performance table for Rule 3: 
YEAR TOTAL CORRECT ACCOUNT WRONG ACCOUNT 
OBSERVATION PREDICT FOR (%) PREDICT FOR (%) 
1986 26 22 84.6 4 15.4 
1987 46 40 87.0 6 13.0 
1988 35 30 85.7 5 14.3 
1989 24 16 66.7 8 33.3 
1990 32 27 84.3 5 1S.7 
1991 32 31 96.9 1 3.10 
86-91 195 166 85.1 29 14.9 
86-91 171 150 87.7 21 12.3 
exclude 89 
While in the years 1989 and 1991, Rule 3 is better than Rule 
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1, in the remaining years, Rule 1 is more satisfactory. Overall, 
Rule 3 over performs slightly Rule 1, but if the year 1989 is 
excluded, Rule 1 provides better criterion for forecasting. 
Both Rule 1 and Rule 3 present better yardstick than Rule 
2. The indicators in the futures market, therefore, do offer 
extra information for foreseeing price trend in the stock market 
under some particular situations, although such information may 
only contribute limited improvement. 
The seemingly contradiction occurs. In the last chapter, 
we claim that, general, open interest and trading volume do not 
provide information for future price movement, which is supported 
by low and insignificant correlation coefficients. One the other 
hand, however, Rule 1 and Rule 3 exhibit that open interest and 
trading volume are able to perform positively in price trend 
prediction. There are two explanation for this problem. 
Firstly, Rule 1 and Rule 3 are only useful for some 
particularly trading days. To utilize the rules, the market 
should be in the stage of either "advancing" or declining", and 
open interest and trading volume should meet some requirement. 
The number of total applicable cases in the two rules are only 
142 and 195, accounting for 10% and 13.7% of number of total 
trading days in the entire period respectively. Therefore, the 
open interest and trading volume are far beyond to hint general 
price trend in the future. 
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Secondly, Rule 1 and Rule 3 only suggest the ups and downs 
in the average price. They do not give the magnitude of price 
change. On the other hand, correlation mirrored the linear 
relationship between the two variable concerned. So, there is 
no inconsistency between the results of two chapters. 
In the following section, a regression approach is adopted 
to test the rules. correspondingly, the dependent variable here 
is the change in average of next five-day price, over the current 
moving average price. That is 
CAS(t+5,5) = {AS(t+5)-AS(t)}/AS(t). 
Rule set up early suggest that there is a need to consider 
the interaction effect of open interest, trading volume and 
change in price level. Thus the independent variables include 
CNO (t) , CV (t) , CAS (t) , CNO (t) *cv (t) , CNO (t) *CAS (t) , CV (t) *CAS (t) , 
and CNO (t) *cv (t) *CAS (t). The stepwise regression method provide 
the following equation 
CAS(t+5,5) = 
0.04331+1.91125CAS(t)+0.09717CNO(t)*CAS(t)+0.00038CNO(t)*CV(t) 
(0.0324) (18.216) (7.136) (1.971) 
The data in parentheses are t-value. The squared R in the 
regression is 0.67285. However, when we use only CAS(t) as the 
independent variable to conduct regression, the squared R is 
0.65632. Therefore, statistically, change in net open interest 
and trading volume do contribute significantly the forecasting 
of market movement. But such contribution is quite small 
compared with the change in previous moving average price. This 
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result is consistent with the previous findings. 
If the net open interest is replaced by gross open interest, 
the similar results yielded. The regression equation becomes: 
CAS(t+5,t) = 
0.12975+1.48885CAS(t)+0.05034CGO(t)*CAS(t) 0.00573CV(t)*CAS(t) 
(0.984) (26.834) (8.321) (-7.482) 
The squared R is 0.6784, compared with 0.65632 when the 
independent variable include CAS alone. 
The rules offer the .information of whether average price ,of 
next five trading days is up or down compared with the current 
average price level, but they do not suggest how much the price 
will be changed. This is the main limitation of these rules. 
Of course, we may use regression equation to determine the 
magnitude of price changes. Unfortunately, the regression result 
show unsatisfactory forecasting performance because squared R is 
only about 0.67. 
38 
CHAPTER VI: HEDGE EFFECTIVENESS 
The simple way to measure the hedge effectiveness of 
futures, according to Ederington (1979) is to calculate the 
correlation coefficient between the change (absolute change) in 
spot price and that of futures. The high correlation is 
associated with high effectiveness of hedge using futures. 
The correlation coefficients are computed accordingly for 
HSI futures. For the futures price, the most active contracts 
are adopted. The following is the results for different years. 
YEAR 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 86-91 
COE. 0.8851 0.9532 0.9223 0.9708 0.9251 0.8682 0.9355 
The correlation is quite high in all years. Overall, high 
correlation coefficient, 0.93955, suggest the hedge effectiveness 
of HSI futures is also high. 
On the yearly basis, 1987 to 1990 showed higher correlation 
than 1986, the year of the birth of HSI futures. This picture 
suggest that the effectiveness was improved after a period of 
market operation. However,. in 1991, the deterioration on such 
effectiveness was witness, although the trading on futures was 
picking up in this year. 
In the following section, the regression is again used to 
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t' 
see the relationship of two changes: 
S(t)-S(t-1) = a + b(F(t)-F(t-1)) 
where set) and F(t) stand for the spot price and the futures 
price of the most active contract at time t. If time t ' is the 
shift day, F(t-1) refers to the price of the same contract as 
F (t) . 
The results are as following: 
Year a b 
1986 0.6369 (0.762) 0.8216 (24.135) 
1987 -0.1849 (-0.109) 0.7335 (18.572) 
1988 0.3043 (0.459) 0.7654 (37.443) 
1989 0.0233 (0.025) 0.8289 (63.219) 
1990 0.5151 (0.578) 0.8484 (38.217) 
1991 0.2542 (0.180) 0.8954 (27.441) 
1986-1991 0.3871 (0.800) 0.7787 (102.554) 
The value of b, the determinant of the hedge ratio, changes 
over time, suggesting that different period may have to use 
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